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individual health problems into collective demands, winning notable policy influence in federal agencies such
as the National lnsti, cutes of Health (NIH) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Activ· ists directly
challenged fundamental principles of both government and medical systems, fighting to affect distribution of
research funds and ques, tioning well-established scientific methods and professional values. In the contest for
decision-making power, those players achieved remarkable success in influencing and infiltrating (some critics
said, undermining) both the politics and science of medical research. Between 1990 and 1995, federal
appropriations for breast cancer study rose from $90 million to $465 million, while in that same period, NIH
AIDS research rose from $743.53 million to $1.338 billion.
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Through the 1980s and early 1990s, the course of American health re-
search was increasingly shaped by politically,aggressive activism for two 
particular diseases, breast cancer and AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome). Even as national stakes rose, both in dollars spent and grow, 
ing demands on the medical system, breast cancer and AIDS advocates 
made government policy-making for research ever more public and con, 
croversial. Through skillful cultivation of political strength, interest groups 
transformed individual health problems into collective demands, winning 
notable policy influence in federal agencies such as the National lnsti, 
cutes of Health (NIH) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Activ· 
ists directly challenged fundamental principles of both government and 
medical systems, fighting to affect distribution of research funds and ques, 
tioning well-established scientific methods and professional values. In the 
contest for decision-making power, those players achieved remarkable 
success in influencing and infiltrating (some critics said, undermining) 
both the politics and science of medical research. Between 1990 and 1995, 
federal appropriations for breast cancer study rose from $90 million to 
$465 million, while in that same period, NIH AIDS research rose from 
$743.53 million to $1.338 billion.1 
Twentieth-century American medicine had never been separate from 
politics, as demonstrated in history of cancer research.2 More than simply 
extending the old politics of medicine, however, activists' pressure reached 
a new level of politicization in the last fifteen years. In previous decades, 
procedures for drug approval and research funding had not commonly 
elicited detailed public interest or sustained passion. Breast cancer and 
AIDS activism established FDA and NIH policy as regular topics for me· 
dia analysis and high,profile public protest. Through activism, policy, 
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making "insiders" (officials and researchers whose claims to expertise were 
secured by professional acknowledgement) were forced to cede some ter-
ritory to "outsiders." Breast cancer and AIDS movements affected direc-
tion of funding and helped re-write official guidelines for research, test-
ing, and drug approval, even as some scientists complained such changes 
endangered medical progress. Men and women without specialized edu-
cation or research credentials found a decision-making place alongside 
scientists and agency executives. Such a development could not be taken 
for granted; in the same years, for example, the National Science Foun-
dation was not subject to any parallel public activism which succeeded in 
pushing broad policy change. 
Challenging medical and agency authority was fundamental to AIDS 
and breast cancer activism, both as a philosophical commitment and as 
means for turning frustration over lack of medical advance into political 
mobilization. Activists operated on the assumption that research was pri-
marily driven not by intellectual curiosity, but by the political climate, 
which could then be manipulated. They approached science and medi-
cine not as disciplines of expertise to be judged on their own professional 
terms, but as potentially (if not actually) flawed social and political en-
terprises. Though scientific and medical workers themselves tended to 
value research as almost ideal objective analysis, activists accused research-
ers and federal officials of incompetence and unfairness, if not gender 
bias, racism, and homophobia. In sometimes conspiratorial-sounding lan-
guage blaming "the system" for literally playing with lives, activists de-
fined research as fair game for public confrontation. Surgeon/activist Su-
san Love likened the battle for breast cancer funds to past fights over 
"civil rights and war resistance and the early women's movement," while 
some AIDS activists adopted Malcolm X's slogan, "By any means neces-
sary."3 
While observers in recent years have written volumes on breast cancer 
and AIDS separately, their policy-making significance for the 1980s and 
early 1990s can be best appreciated by examining them in tandem. Their 
activism evolved with significant parallels; not coincidentally, since the 
two causes learned from each other's approaches and cooperated. For both 
breast cancer and AIDS, activism coalesced around specific population 
and political subgroups: women and homosexuals respectively; though 
sexual orientation did not limit AIDS infection, gay groups took leader-
ship in promoting action. In each case, mobilization, protest, and hard-
fought campaigns brought public attention and political clout to disease-
specific concern, winning activists recognition and policy concessions even 
as they questioned scientific and government authority. 
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Politicization of Women's Health 
1980s and early 1990s politicization of breast cancer was closely linked to 
general history of modern feminist concerns. Through the 1960s, as women 
organized around explicitly feminist motivations, they began scrutinizing 
gender dimensions of political, social and economic life, including health 
care. Under the maxim of"the personal as political," women's health was 
transformed from individual problems into a mutual concern and impetus 
for political action. 
From its 1969 start, the Boston Women's Health Collective encour, 
aged women to educate themselves about their physical well,being, to 
become informed health consumers who would refuse to tolerate conde, 
scending or inadequate treatment by the medical system. The group's 197 4 
reference Our Bodies, Ourselves described both medical details and women's 
own health experiences, from childbirth to contraception and more; within 
a decade, the text sold more than two million copies nationwide. In 1975, 
concerned parties established the National Women's Health Network to 
draw attention to female health issues and distribute information. Fe, 
male, friendly health clinics became important providers of women's medi, 
cal treatment and also worked to influence policy: rather than waiting for 
development of new contraceptives, feminist clinics helped promote cer, 
vical cap research:~ 
Women's health mobilization also crystallized in response to two medical 
disasters: the Dalk.onShield, touted as a wonderful new 1970s IUD, turned 
out to cause miscarriage and pelvic inflammatory disease (some severe 
cases proving fatal}, while the drug DES, once popularly administered to 
. pregnant women in hope of avoiding miscarriage, was linked to cancer 
and reproductive problems extending even two generations down from 
users.5 Frustrated by seeming failure of doctors, lawyers, and politicians to 
provide information, health care, or compensation, concerned women 
formed grass,roots organizations such as DES Action to support affected 
women, raise public awareness, and maintain political, medical, and legal 
pressure. 
By the late 1980s, feminist advocates argued that beyond disastrous 
products such as DES and the Shield, women's health had been system, 
atically endangered by an entire medical establishment. Health was a 
gendered issue, critics contended; despite evidence of important medical 
differences between men and women on such matters as cholesterol lev, 
els, researchers often investigated health questions or tested new drugs 
on male subjects alone. The multi,year Physician's Health Study espe, 
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cially troubled women's advocates; the report relied on an all-male sample 
of 22,000 doctors and so offered no evidence whether aspirin's cardiovas-
cular benefits held true for females. The project head pointed to inherent 
constraints such as relative scarcity of older female doctors to comple-
ment the male study population, though critics asked why researchers 
could not draw on nurses or other predominantly female groups. The di-
rector maintained female subjects would also have confused results and 
increased expense of an already difficult project by introducing new sci-
entific factors such as hormonal interactions, a fairly common attitude 
among researchers. He warned science would suffer if political pressure 
compelled researchers to alter studies, regardless of appropriateness, to fit 
a mandated gender balance; drug companies added their own cautions 
that potential harm to a fetus meant special risk in testing women of 
childbearing age.6 
Nevertheless, political forces had acquired momentum. In 1986, Pub-
lic Health Service (PHS) officials spoke up for greater awareness of 
women's issues in medical studies, NIH then created policy encouraging 
all grant applicants to "consider the inclusion of women" and justify any 
research excluding female subjects. Four years later, however, a General 
Accounting Office (GAO) analysis confirmed women's suspicions that 
the new policy had been ineffective, that numerous research proposals 
still ignored gender considerations. The Congressional Caucus for 
Women's Issues subsequently introduced Women's Health Equity Act leg-
islation which would, among other measures, create a special OB/GYN 
program at NIH and enforce rules for including female subjects in re-
search. The Act drew growing attention, and soon House and Senate 
subcommittees adopted some of its provisions as part ofNIH reauthoriza-
tion. To try regaining credibility and demonstrate good faith on the ques-
tion of women and research, NIH officials adopted strategy to separate 
and institutionalize responsibility for female health. In September, 1990, 
NIH established a new Office of Research on Women's Health, winning 
praise from Women's Caucus co-chair, Representative Patricia Schroeder, 
who had previously blamed male-dominated policy for leaving women's 
health "at risk."7 
The campaign for women's health united feminist advocates, sympa-
thetic politicians such as Schroeder; individual doctors, scientists and 
medical researchers also supported the cause and organized groups such 
as the Society for the Advancement of Women's Health Research. By the 
1990s, medical journals featured notable numbers of articles and editori-
als on the issue, as JAMA put it, whether there was "still too much ex-
trapolation from data on middle-aged white men."8 
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Interest groups made an ever,larger case, arguing that beyond women's 
underrepresentation in studies, gender bias extended to systematic ineq, 
uity in federal health funds. For activists, dollars defined commitment; 
critics complained NIH committed just $778 million to female,specific 
research within a $6 billion overall budget.9 The National Women's Health 
Network pressured politicians to rectify past injustice by immediately in, 
vesting more money in female medicine. 
In 1991, one week after confirmation as first female head of NIH, 
Bernadine Healy announced the agency was creating a $600 million, fif, 
ceen,year Women's Health Initiative to redress history of gendered re, 
search imbalance. Healy called this NIH's "awakening to a simple fact ... 
that women have unique medical problems." Explaining that women at 
or past menopause had been doubly,neglected due to age as well as gen, 
der bias, the agency announced plans to concentrate on advancing medi, 
cal knowledge of older women. As Science noted, that choice of focus also 
did credit to "Healy's political acumen," diverting attention from contro, 
versial reproductive topics "such as post,conception ... birth control and 
fetal tissue transplant research."10 
Healy's announcement, making national news, won approval from 
women's groups, while NIH reported being flooded by letters and calls 
expressing "enormous" interest in the new program and praise. The head 
of NIH's Office of Research on Women's Health commented, "Women's 
health has risen to the public's consciousness in a way I would not have 
dreamed .... "11 The Initiative program confirmed the 1980s-1990s trans, 
formation of medicine into a gendered policy issue, granting seemingly 
unquestionable political victory for activists' case that women's health 
deserved special attention. Initiative research, planned to involve up to 
160,000 women, would represent the biggest single clinical trial andre, 
search effort in NIH history. 
While gratifying women's health activists, that fact met more dubious 
response from some scientific and medical quarters. The Initiative's giant 
scale and proposed structure drew criticism: with previous NIH work cen, 
cering on relatively small,scale investigations proposed by researchers, 
why should the agency suddenly switch to an enormous undertaking di, 
rected top,down? Even while acknowledging that women's medical prob, 
lems deserved increased support than in previous years, some observers 
worried the new commitment represented too much too soon, that a sud, 
den financial influx might not be the wisest means of correcting past in, 
equity. 
Other researchers expressed concern about initial scientific details, such 
as plans for overlapping clinical trials on 63,000 women to see how nutri, 
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ent supplements, exercise, low~fat food regimens, and hormone treatment 
affected cancer, heart disease, and osteoporosis. Several dozen female epi~ 
demiologists worried such a complicated project would be undermined by 
both technical flaws (sorting out multiple factors) and practical difficul~ 
ties (unlikelihood of convincing women to continue demanding lifestyle 
changes over ten or more years of study). In 1993, a formal Institute of 
Medicine review criticized the Initiative on numerous grounds, though 
members felt "frustrated with the assignment of assessing an expensive 
project ... already under way." Plans for investigating whether reduced~fat 
diets could lower breast cancer risk seemed "weakest," unlikely to yield 
valuable information. The committee also worried NIH had understated 
trial expenses, allocating under half what could be projected from cost of 
previous studies. The group recommended that "better designed, smaller, 
more focused studies" would offer "greater chance of success and probably 
be less costly" than one huge effort. At the same time, reviewers con~ 
ceded political reality: canceling the Initiative would be seen to "prove 
that the government does not really care about women's health." How~ 
ever valid the scientific criticism, the large Initiative satisfied NIH's po~ 
litical needs, addressing feminist demands for funding and research atten~ 
tion.U 
Focus on Breast Cancer 
Within this context of activism for general women's health research, one 
particular disease, breast cancer, attracted increasing attention in the 
1980s. New organizations were founded to focus public awareness and 
support concerned women; for example, the Susan G. Kamen Breast Can~ 
cer Foundation, established in 1982, became known for organizing "Race 
for the Cure" runs in fifty~eight cities to raise money for research, educa~ 
tion, and screening programs. Such groups gathered political strength, 
mobilizing to get government and public alike to recognize breast cancer 
as a unique concern and allocate special funds to fight the disease. 
In this new political battle for breast cancer research, Susan Love, 
UCLA Associate Professor of Clinical Surgery and Director of the Revlon/ 
UCLA Breast Center, established visibility and a dual identity as both 
doctor and political player. Historically, other practitioners, from occu~ 
pational medicine pioneer Alice Hamilton to pediatrician Benjamin 
Spack, had combined professionalism with social and political expres~ 
sian. However, Love increasingly defined her medical and activist breast 
cancer work as inseparable, even as many health professionals still felt 
~SING MONEY AND POWER 
,fat food regimens, and hormone treatment 
and osteoporosis. Several dozen female epi, 
mplicatedproject would be undermined by 
)Ut multiple factors) and practical difficul, 
ng women to continue demanding lifestyle 
Lrs of study). In 1993, a formal Institute of 
e Initiative on numerous grounds, though 
the assignment of assessing an expensive 
Plans for investigating whether reduced,fat 
er risk seemed "weakest," unlikely to yield 
mrnittee also worried NIH had understated 
~r half what could be projected from cost of 
:commended that "better designed, smaller, 
ffer"greater chance of success and probably 
~ effort. At the same time, reviewers con, 
ling the Initiative would be seen to "prove 
•t really care about women's health." How, 
:ism, the large Initiative satisfied NIH's po, 
1ist demands for funding and research atten, 
on Breast Cancer 
;m for general women's health research, one 
:1cer, attracted increasing attention in the 
ere founded to focus public awareness and 
'r example, the Susan G. Komen Breast Can, 
n 1982, became known for organizing "Race 
:ht cities to raise money for research, educa, 
s. Such groups gathered political strength, 
t and public alike to recognize breast cancer 
cate special funds to fight the disease. 
:le for breast cancer research, Susan Love, 
·Clinical Surgery and Director of the Revlon/ 
lished visibility and a dual identity as both 
:listorically, other practitioners, from occu, 
Alice Hamilton to pediatrician Benjamin 
;sionalism with social and political expres, 
ngly defined her medical and activist breast 
even as many health professionals still felt 
AMYSUEBIX 11 
uncomfortable positioning themselves to challenge the political and medi, 
cal order. Love linked her political awakening to her promotion of her 
1990 reference book for women concerned about breast cancer; after she 
tossed off a line proposing a "march topless on the White House" to "make 
President Bush wake up and do something about breast cancer," she found 
female listeners ready to take her seriously. Calling this group "fed up ... 
that this virtual epidemic was being ignored,"13 Love became increasingly 
vocal about breast cancer being as much a political as medical battle. 
Following broader campaigns for women's health research, breast can, 
cer concerns maintained that government and medical authorities had 
ignored the disease even as it approached epidemic proportion; news com, 
mentator Cokie Roberts observed that women's 44,500 breast cancer 
deaths in 1991 exceeded the total of American soldiers killed in Viet, 
nam.14 Activists based their work on certain presumptions: without in, 
creased federal support, the country would make little progress on breast 
cancer, but given satisfactory resources, movement leaders promised, the 
disease could be conquered so modern women's daughters and granddaugh, 
ters would not experience similar fear of breast cancer. To drive this agenda, 
Love helped establish the National Breast Cancer Coalition in 1991, link, 
ing separate advocacy groups to multiply their political effectiveness and 
muster parade rallies and other demonstrations of public support. Col, 
lecting thousands of signatures in petition drives to the President and 
Congress demanding more breast cancer research, the Coalition gained 
access to present its case to both Bill and Hillary Clinton.15 
Women's push for breast cancer money broke through partisan lines; 
Republicans such as Marilyn Quayle and Olympia Snowe joined Demo, 
crats Mary Rose Oakar and Schroeder. Senators such as Edward Kennedy 
and Tom Harkin (who lost several relatives to the disease) proved useful 
allies in Congress. Breast cancer groups also benefitted because their ap, 
peal coincided with a unique point in national politics; the 1991 nation, 
ally,televised hearings on sexual harassment charges in Clarence Tho, 
mas' confirmation as Supreme Court justice had left some Americans with 
an impression of Congress as insensitive to females' concerns. To mend 
political fences, some representatives turned to breast cancer funding to 
demonstrate willingness to listen to women's demands; Senator Arlen 
Specter, whose image had been especially damaged by harsh cross,exami, 
nation of Anita Hill, especially highlighted his commitment to fighting 
breast cancer. Furthermore, in 1992, ongoing fallout over the hearings 
swept a number of women candidates into Congress; "the Anita Hill class" 
then established greater female representation on committees and sub, 
committees where they could speak up for women's health issues such as 
breast cancer. 
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As another advantage, no other advocates of specific women's diseases 
had achieved similarly high political profile by the 1990s, so breast cancer 
activists did not have to compete with other feminists for money and politi-
cal consideration. Breast cancer could also be considered politically safe: while 
a campaign against women's lung cancer would have forced politicians to risk 
alienating Southern tobacco interests and defy the notoriously tough ciga-
rette lobby, breast cancer did not seem to necessitate major confrontation. 
As Love acknowledged, advocates had demographics on their side; breast 
cancer had an image of affecting middle or upper-class Caucasian females, a 
crucial political constituency. For those reasons, supporting higher breast can-
cer funding became a way for politicians to exhibit awareness of women's 
issues. In 1991, government money for studying breast cancer rose $43 mil-
lion, raising by half the previous level of$90 million; in 1991, funds soared to 
more than $400 million across various federal agencies. Within the National 
Cancer Institute (NCI) alone, breast cancer support jumped from $197 mil-
lion to almost$163 million between 1993 and 1994; to place that in perspec-
tive, NCI devoted just over $90 million to lung cancer and under $50 million 
to prostate cancer in that same period.16 
Such developments reflected new reality: breast cancer had been estab-
lished as the single most politically compelling part of women's medicine. In 
fact, politicians and advocates alike often equated feminist health concern 
with breast cancer issues, a powerful link. Corporate sponsors such as Revlon 
enlisted in fighting breast cancer, providing research funds and other resources 
while highlighting their support as showing the female market they took 
women's issues seriously. Public commitment to breast cancer research be-
came a "safe" yet powerful symbol of sensitivity. 
Such a development contrasted sharply with previous American attitudes 
toward breast cancer; women affected in the early twentieth century had 
tended to keep the disease a close secret, afraid cancer reflected badly on 
them personally or simply considering it a private concern. The 1980s-1990s 
establishment of breast cancer as a public political issue was exemplified by a 
sign at one rally: "Ask me about our demands to the US Govt." With ability 
and motivation to translate individual experience into group mobilization, 
transform concern into "demands," women's activists gave breast cancer new 
visibility and power to influence government funding decisions. 
Politicization of AIDS 
Just as feminist organizations provided both philosophical and practical 
impetus for activists to demand increasing funding and attention for 
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women's heaLth in general and breast cancer in particular, so AIDS activ .. 
ism reflected mobilization of American's gay community. While the 1960s 
and 1970s had represented an alternately heady and frustrating period of 
personal concern and political organization for gays, the 1980s brought 
what seemed the greatest challenge yet, a devastating and mysterious new 
disease. By 1981, West Coast doctors treating the gay population started 
noticing clusters of immune deficiency problems. Physicians and research .. 
ers at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) found unusually frequent 
reports of rare pneumonia and cancer forms. CDC medical detectives 
.initially had to sort through a variety of possible causes, from chemical 
poisoning to recreational drug use, and perceived the threat as sufficiently 
urgent to warrant special studies of what some referred to as "Gay .. Re .. 
lated Immune Deficiency" (GRID). However, Reagan .. era budget cuts 
threatened to force CDC staff layoffs, with devastating impact on agency 
plans and morale. NIH had no coordinated strategy for addressing the 
new disease, while clinic doctors were literally writing rules as they went 
along on how to treat the now .. renamed "AIDS." Gay aides on Capital 
Hill tried pressing for increased federaL research support. However, NIH 
representatives and Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Mar .. 
garet Heckler officially assured skeptics that funding for AIDS work was 
"more than adequate." At various times, budget planners even proposed 
cuts of 10 percent or more. Meanwhile, between 1983 and 1985, United 
States AIOS cases jumped from three thousand to sixteen thousand, fi .. 
nally attracting significant national media coverage, especially after an .. 
nouncement of actor Rock Hudson's infection. Though Surgeon General 
C. Everett Koop began preparing to address the public on the nature and 
prevention of AIDS, concerned observers detected damning lack ofleader .. 
ship, if not outright sabotage, by the Reagan presidency and federal bu .. 
reaucracy on research to fight the new fatal illnessP 
With increasing awareness of AIDS, 1980s gay community leaders 
mobilized resources for both medical and political efforts. Just as femi .. 
nists had founded the Boston Women's Health Collective, National 
Women's Health Network, DES Action, and National Breast Cancer 
Coalition to call attention to women's health, so gay groups created new 
AIDS organizations. One West Coast group evolved into the San Fran .. 
cisco AIDS Foundation, while New York leaders established Gay Men's 
HeaLth Crisis, along with the American Foundation for AIDS Research 
(Amfar). 
The most brazen group, ACT ... UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power), 
had been organized in 1987, largely at New York writer/gay activist Larry 
Kramer's initiative. Members targeted public figures they believed had 
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expressed insensitive attitudes or failed to show proper commitment to 
fighting AIDS, from Michael Dukakis and Ed Koch to George Bush and 
Jesse Helms. Hundreds of ACT~UP supporters took political confronta~ 
tion to radical heights, designing strategies to draw media attention; most 
notably disrupting a December, 1989 mass at New York's St. Patrick's 
Cathedral to condemn church positions on AIDS, condoms, and sex edu~ 
cation. Protesters also broke into government hearings, prime~time net~ 
work newscasts, and political speeches across the country to vent opin~ 
ions on the AIDS crisis.18 
Behind such public protest, AIDS activists organized special commit~ 
tees to help care for patients, prepare and distribute preventive public 
health information, and support research on the disease. As advocates 
educated themselves about medical details, that sense of knowledge helped 
some approach health experts on an informed footing, winning profes~ 
sional respect for their seriousness. But the late 1980s proved discourag~ 
ing; while laboratories turned up apparently hopeful clues to disease mecha~ 
nisms, converting such findings into practical treatments continued to be 
difficult and slower than even some experts had predicted. Linking this 
medical impasse to lack of adequate research funding, frustrated activists 
blamed government apathy for extending the crisis; Kramer called fed~ 
eral efforts to fight AIDS "murderously slow."19 
Advocates complained that once developed, medical treatments took 
longer than necessary to reach desperate patients, due to dragging gov~ 
ernment regulatory processes. In addition to familiarizing themselves with 
medical facts, AIDS groups also started learning how NIH and FDA op~ 
erated, to challenge those authorities more effectively.20 Incensed with 
seemingly unconscionable bureaucratic delay in approving new drugs, 
ACT~UP staged sit~ins at NIH and "die~ ins" in front of FDA facilities to 
dramatize demands. 21 The call for action on a 1994 World AIDS Day poster 
ran, "Red ribbons are a nice gesture. It's red tape we won't stand for."22 
FDA drug approval processes had evolved over decades, reflecting vari~ 
ous concerns of physicians, pharmaceutical lobbyists, and (infrequently) 
even the public. Since the 1960s, as the FDA consolidated power and 
placed highest priority on avoiding thalidomide~style disaster, time elaps~ 
ing before approval lengthened. Accusing the "snail~ like" FDA of having 
"buried" pharmaceutical companies under "increasingly onerous" and 
"arbitrar[y]" rules, Tufts analyst Louis Lasagna wrote in 1989, "The FDA 
prides itself on being the most demanding regulatory agency in the world ... 
remarkably unconcerned about any drug lag .... "23 
Standard procedure before the 1980s allowed corporations, doctors, or 
other sponsors to register Investigational New Drug applications with the 
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FDA after conducting basic safety studies on animals. The IND then pro .. 
vided go .. ahead for three .. stage human clinical testing (with continued 
animal tests): Phase I small .. group clinical pharmacology tests designed 
to identify any negative side effects; Phase II controlled clinical investi .. 
gations to evaluate effectiveness; and 1arger .. sca1e Phase III double .. blind 
work with placebo controls. Products passing all three levels were cleared 
to file a New Drug Application, with one last review of data to gain final 
market approval.24 
But by the late 1980s, AIDS groups such as Treatment Action Group 
(TAG) ·and Project Inform subjected established approval procedure to 
tough new scrutiny. For victims of drastic terminal disease, advocates ar .. 
gued, conventional concerns about side effects and scientifically .. mea .. 
sured efficacy were meaningless, while trials comparing new treatments 
with placebo controls or older drugs inhumanely denied subjects access 
to promising medicine. While activists fought the system, patients trav .. 
elled to Mexico to acquire drugs not yet approved in the United States or 
patronized "black market" clinics which offered a wider range of treat .. 
ment options than regular doctors.25 
Late 1980s FDA operations floundered as staff tried to cope with ex .. 
panding responsibilities under tight Reagan budgets. But 1987 policy 
changes moved toward accommodating demands of extremely sick pa .. 
tients; under a "treatment IND," doctors could give victims of "immedi .. 
ately life .. threatening disease" potentially beneficial medicines which had 
not yet passed final investigation. Moreover, while the agency insisted on 
continued vigilance to block potentially dangerous or fraudulent treat .. 
ments, it agreed to experiment with allowing some patients to bring from 
abroad medicines not yet approved in America and letting doctors test 
old drugs for new uses.26 
The 1991 appointment of pediatrian and law professor David Kessler 
as new FDA commissioner led the agency to acknowledge and deal more 
explicitly with AIDS groups' pressure, just as Healy's NIH work both re .. 
fleeted and affected the changing political context of breast cancer con .. 
cern.
27 Establishing new relationships with informed activists (among oth .. 
ers), Kessler moved FDA toward a new image of responsiveness while 
maintaining responsibility for public safety. An HHS Committee review 
encouraged the agency to foster more rapid and "dynamic" approval pro .. 
cedures, and Kessler agreed that in "balanc[ing] the need to make drugs 
available quickly with the need to ensure that patients do not receive 
unsafe or ineffective products," FDA could afford to swing toward facili .. 
tating access for fatal diseases such as AIDS. For such desperate cases, the 
FDA soon instituted special accommodations for "accelerated approval"; 
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while officials would still require basic safety tests, agency decisions could 
come before extensive trials proved effectiveness or without waiting for 
precise application terms to be refined.28 
Largely in response to such internal and external pressure, FDRs aver, 
age time before deciding to approve or deny new drug applications dropped 
42 percent between 1987 and 1992, from thirty,three months to eigh, 
teen, the GAO reported. In December, 1995, the FDA proudly pointed 
to record speed in approving the new protease,inhibiting AIDS drug 
saquinavir, just over three months from the manufacturer's first submis, 
sion. In fact, officials announced, all six anti, AIDS drugs approved in the 
preceding seven years had come through government review in six months 
or less.29 
Early 1990s AIDS activism had not run perfectly smoothly; some ad .. 
vocates expressed reseQtful sense that public attention had faded away. 
Critics worried even the gay community was experiencing "compassion 
fatigue" or "AIDS burnout," while charging leaders let themselves be dis, 
tracted by other political questions such as repealing the military ban on 
homosexuals. Nevertheless, AIDS advocates had established their legiti, 
macy, a sense of a right to be involved with policy,making at NIH and 
FDA, the admirlistration and Congress. In December, 1995, activists gath, 
ered at the first White House conference on HIV and AIDS, along with 
researchers and medical officials, to encourage and pressure Clinton to 
maintain government's fight against the disease. Meanwhile, the CDC 
announced AIDS stood as the leading source of fatality for white men 
twenty,five to forty,four years old, and the third cause for women that 
age (behind cancer and injury), with 41,930 overall American AIDS 
deaths reported in 1994.30 
Politicizing Numbers, Politicizing Research Money 
AIDS and breast cancer advocacy, of course, were not absolutely identi, 
cal. For example, though women concerned with health issues were able 
to draw on increased female Congressional representation after 1992, gay 
groups could not count on having as many "natural" allies come forward 
in the political establishment. Overall, however, activist development 
for breast cancer and AIDS displayed significant parallels; in both cases, 
mobilized organizations transformed a group's specific medical problem 
into concerns defined as politically crucial. Both AIDS and breast cancer 
could leave victims feeling powerless, a sense reinforced by consciousness 
of women's and gays' status as "outsiders." Political activity offered a way 
to rechannel frustration, away from individual battles against an enemy 
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inside (disease itself), into organized campaigns challenging stubborn 
outside forces ("the political establishment," "medical system," or both). 
Even if policy changes and renewed research funding came too late to 
bring a particular patient/activist any personal medical help, organiza~ 
tions drew the individual into a broader fight, promising their commit~ 
ment would broadly benefit entire groups of others, even curing or pre .. 
venting future disease. Both breast cancer and AIDS activists operated 
from conviction that previous medical funding and research policy had 
been systematically biased against investigation of "their" disease. Some 
almost .. moralistic undertones insisted government and medical authori~ 
ties confess previous "injustices," then to be atoned for by generous new 
spending. 
Similarities between AIDS and breast cancer activism should not be 
surprising. From the late 1980s on, leaders in the two camps studied each 
other's work, modelling new efforts in light of what had succeeded for the 
other cause. Breast cancer advocates adopted tactics initiated by AIDS 
activists and vice versa,31 cooperating where they saw common need for 
action. For example, members of Women's Health Action and Mobiliza .. 
tion (WHAM!), sharingACT .. UP's aggressive political inclination, joined 
the 1989 St. Patrick's protest against certain Catholic moral precepts. 
Each movement developed special fund~raising and public awareness 
events (from breast cancer~benefit fashion shows, to AIDS~benefit the~ 
ater, music, and art events). Both causes even acquired shorthand sym .. 
bols of support: red ribbons for AIDS and pink for breast cancer, fashion .. 
able accessories among regular Americans and Hollywood celebrities wish .. 
ing to display political and philosophical solidarity with activists. 
In both cases, AIDS and breast cancer activists achieved certain rec .. 
ognition by White House and Congressional politicians, doctors, FDA 
and NIH officials even as they harshly criticized government and medical 
authority. As examples, the 1992 International Conference on AIDS of~ 
fered a forum to representatives of TAG, one of the groups pushing to 
reform drug approval,32 while health agencies arranged for advocates to 
participate in grant review and research planning. 
To support demands, both AIDS and breast cancer activists relied on 
figures purporting to demonstrate basic inequities in the medical system, 
but numbers could be disputed. For example, while many scientists, medical 
experts, and journals agreed with feminists that gender balance in re .. 
search should be a source of concern, others disputed that severe bias had 
been as widespread as critics portrayed. A 1991 NCI study noted, for 
instance, that women, 35 percent of new lung cancer cases, accounted for 
33 percent of subjects in lung cancer clinical trials.33 
AIDS and breast cancer groups also employed numbers for broader 
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purpose; to emphasize the urgency of increased funding, activists repeat .. 
edly stressed how many Americans were threatened by "their" disease. 
Such statistics could be challenged; especially in early years of AIDS con .. 
cern, projections of total infection and relative demographic risk varied 
widely, from conservative to apocalyptic. Breast cancer activists' litera .. 
ture, placards and buttons spread the byword that the disease confronted 
one in nine American women; one group adopted the slogan "one in nine" 
as its name.34 While easy to remember and politically powerful, themes .. 
sage could be misleading, since the number only held true given assump .. 
tions of an 85 .. year lifespan for women. Furthermore, rather than striking 
one in nine at any age, breast cancer in reality exhibited far greater stat is .. 
tical incidence in older women. In projecting younger women as its face, 
then, the movement tended to distort relative risks. Activists declared, 
however, "If the disease continues to spiral at the present rate, our daugh .. 
ters and granddaughters will have a one in four chance of ... breast can .. 
cer."35 
Breast cancer activists deserved credit for tangible progre;ss in public 
awareness, both through the movement's own campaigns and the drive 
for increased media coverage. By the 1990s, the number of American 
women having mammograms rose significantly; up to 65 percent of fe .. 
males past age forty had breast exams.36 Earlier diagnoses, combined with 
better treatment options, were cited as factors in the 4.7 percent decline 
in breast cancer deaths between 1989 and 1992; fatality for women age 
thirty to fifty .. nine dropped eight or nine percent.37 Clearly, through the 
mid .. 1990s, many important questions about breast cancer remained un .. · 
answered, especially relating to the exact nature of risk factors such as 
diet, environment, and genetics. Many doctors testified to need for fur .. 
ther investigation; Susan Love stressed the goal of developing practical 
tests to.screen breasts for cancer on a regular basis, analogous to the way 
Pap smears checked for cervical cancer.38 
As activists turned numbers into a political tool to gain clout, they 
established breast cancer funding as a key vote for politicians to show 
dedication to women's concern. However, Washington could support only 
so many key issues, and defining breast cancer as the primary principle 
risked in effect shunting aside other female health problems, arguably at 
least as serious. Similarly, American women themselves started thinking 
of breast cancer as their single greatest health danger, overwhelmingly 
out of proportion to actual risk. One study showed 46 percent of women 
convinced that breast cancer posed a major threat, though only 4 percent 
overall were likely to develop it; by contrast, while 36 percent could be 
expected to face heart disease, a mere 4 percent judged cardiac problems 
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a serious risk.39 Of course, the very idea of cancer in general had acquired 
terrible emotional connotations, while some observers contended that 
breast cancer represented a uniquely terrifying form. Because of the sig .. 
nificance attached to breasts in American culture, they argued, the can .. 
cer threatened the most vital physical and psychological sense of femi .. 
nine identity. 
Nevertheless, while breast cancer advocates established the issue at 
the center of women's health politics, drawing cover stories in Newsweek, 
the New York Times Magazine, and Ms.(among other publications), heart 
disease remained the primary source of overall female death. Though rela .. 
tively unnoticed politically, cardiac trouble proved fatal for close to six 
times more American women than breast cancer. Since the 1950s, Mayo 
Clinic studies indicated, women's incidence of coronary heart disease rose 
even as men's rates dropped, while female heart attack fatality passed 
male death rates. While research had not yet solved many breast cancer 
questions, risks and treatment of women's heart disease also entailed medi .. 
cal unknowns and issues of gender bias.40 
Moreover, medical reports emphasized that lung cancer, with increas .. 
ing incidence and high mortality, actually accounted for more female 
deaths per year than breast cancer. Comparing 1975-1979 to 1987-1991, 
lung cancer incidence in women grew 65.3 percent, versus a 2.5 percent 
rise in men, according to NCI. While smoking had once been predomi .. 
nantly a male habit, discouraged if not forbidden for women, modern so .. 
cial change led female cigarette use to start catching up. Studies since the 
late 1970s showed teenage girls more likely than boys to experiment with 
smoking, as an appealing way to control weight or stress; some tobacco 
company advertising also increasingly targeted young women. Extrapo .. 
lating from present trends, one PHS official suggested women's cigarette 
use would pass men's by 2000, reshaping female health risks.41 While breast 
cancer medicine offered no miracles by the 1990s, other types such as 
ovarian cancer also remained notably difficult to detect and colon cancer 
hard to treat. A 1994 report, "Cancer at the Crossroad," concluded that 
though the country had invested over $23 billion on general research in 
twenty .. three years since President Richard Nixon's "War on Cancer," 
relatively little overall progress had been made on the disease.42 
Such facts served as reminders that while activists had won new con .. 
sideration for the important breast cancer issue, no comparable political 
clout had been mustered for other serious diseases in women such as lung 
cancer or heart disease. Activists such as Love dismissed fear that breast 
cancer might deplete other research, maintaining health should not be a 
zero .. sum game and that funds could easily come out of "useless govern .. 
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ment spending." But while an ideal world might offer ample money to 
study all disease, 1990s political and financial reality, such as renewed 
attention to balanced budgeting, brought talk of tough review of scien, 
tific and medical spending.43 Nevertheless, through early 1996, breast 
cancer advocates in Congress had succeeded in largely protecting their 
gains in funding from the threat of harsh cuts. 
Within that political context, those concerned about other diseases 
felt compelled to try developing new power to keep up with AIDS and 
breast cancer activism. In 1996, the American Heart Association com, 
plained the nation spent $1,700 in research per heart,disease death, ver, 
sus $39,000 per AIDS fatality. AIDS activists insisted the comparison did 
not hold, since heart research was well,established while AIDS still in, 
valved tremendous unknowns, but the Heart Association announced its 
intent to engage in letter .. writing, marches and other attention,getting 
tactics which had worked for AIDS politics. But at the same time, AIDS 
and breast cancer activists declared still more ambitious federal funding 
goals; the National Breast Cancer Coalition directed supporters to ask 
Clinton and Congress to "invest $2.6 billion in quality breast cancer re, 
search to find a cause and cure, between now and the Year 2000."44 
Breast cancer and AIDS activism promoted the impression that given 
past shortfalls in research, any sizable new funding would by definition be 
money well spent. The politicized drive for specific disease funding some, 
times threatened to rush ahead of scientific ideas on how best to use new 
resources. Nature described one version of a 1991 NIH report on plan, 
ning women's health research as just "a laundry list of needs," calling for 
"urgent ... research" on "every conceivable aspect of a women's life from 
conception to death" while conspicuously "missing ... proposals for scien, 
tifically innovative ideas."45 In other cases, high.-profile disease politics 
led to some detours around established medical system planning, as with 
the 1993 special $210 million appropriation for breast cancer research 
allocated not to NIH, FDA or NCI, but the Department of Defense. 
Though the devastating impact of AIDS and breast cancer made it 
difficult to challenge the need for progress, some critics did question the 
merit of skyrocketing funding. Commenting on perceptions of discrimi .. 
nation against women's health, University of Southern California Norris 
Cancer Center biostatistician Leslie Bernstein said in 1995 that "the aca.-
demic world ... always had funding to research breast cancer. Less has been 
spent on studying male.-only cancers like prostate cancer and tesdcular 
cancer .... " One policy analyst (and former breast cancer patient) worried 
that activist politics meant "micromanagement of science that doesn't 
result in the best spending ... " while Georgetown's cancer center head 
agreed with concern about "advocacy going overboard."46 
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Love classed such opinion as "backlash" from researchers who resented 
having to accede to new "taxpayer" new power in directing funding; how.-
ever, some doubts not so easily dismissed came from individuals sympa .. 
thetic to women's causes. Columnist Anna Quindlen noted in 1993 that 
when NCI "now spends more for research on breast cancer than for pros.-
tate, ovarian, colo.-rectal and liver cancers combined," it showed "some .. 
thing wrong ... with how survivor advocacy has driven research dollars ... a 
research agenda that relies so heavily on who makes the most noise." 
Women's health, she said, would be best served by "a big.-picture policy in 
which, without fear or favor, funding decisions are based on what will 
yield best results ... " determined by science rather than politicsY 
Challenging Research and Testing Procedures 
Fundamentally, AIDS and breast cancer activists were challenging and 
politicizing not only funding, but the structure and scientific values of 
research itself. Under ongoing criticism that NIH had not effectively 
mandated gender balance in research pools, 1994 agency changes set new 
guidelines requiring clinical trials to make "valid analysis" of whether the 
treatment in question affected women and minorities differently than white 
males. Some scientists resented the policy as imposition of political cor .. 
rectness which would cause delay and add to research cost; a Johns Hopkins 
biostatistician called it "very foolish and very harsh law that is not in the 
public's interest." Similarly, for AIDS, some researchers feared that FDA 
policy change granting more generous access to experimental drugs actu .. 
ally undermined scientific need to acquire knowledge about new medi .. 
cines. A 1994 FDA review of accelerated approval showed that after treat .. 
ments such as DDI and DDC became available, manufacturers never com .. 
pleted follow .. up research proving effectiveness. While it was one thing 
for advocates to win political battles, it remained another matter to con.-
vince researchers that resulting policy change did not hurt medical 
progress.48 
Some AIDS and breast cancer activism explicitly challenged funda .. 
mental scientific method such as randomized research trials comparing 
new promising treatment against placebos or older drugs. AIDS groups 
objected that random tests might leave some patients stuck with ineffec .. 
tive medicine; a tombstone .. shaped poster at one protest read, "I got the 
placebo." Some FDA officials and researchers feared such objections might 
end up undermining necessary studies of new AIDS medicine, if "com.-
passionate" or accelerated approval policy offered patients alternate ac.-
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cess to experimental drugs without risk of "getting the placebo."49 Simi~ 
lady, some women voiced displeasure with randomized controlled test~ 
ing, as researcher Ann Oakley found in a British study of whether home 
visits and other support made pregnant women more comfortable and 
resulted in healthier babies. Midwives in the study, worrying that moth~ 
ers who really needed help might end up in the control group, tried to 
subvert randomizing mechanisms by persuading secretaries or otherwise 
trying to steer certain subjects into the list assigned home visits. 5° Though 
scientists relied on random clinical trials as a vital scientific method for 
eliminating bias and so yielding objective results, outside observers did 
not necessarily value the procedure similarly. 
In other cases, breast cancer and AIDS patients actually rejected sci~ 
entific testing procedures. According to a 1995 report, NCI tests of bone 
marrow transplants as breast cancer treatment had been undercut be~ 
cause women feared they might be randomly placed in control sections 
receiving less aggressive therapy. When possible, patients simply chose to 
avoid enrolling in NCI trials, instead just finding providers willing to give 
them transplants directly. Worrying that failure to recruit enough sub~ 
jects might make it impossible to conduct valid tests, the NCI project 
head hoped physicians might "take a stand and not let this stampede to 
bone marrow transplant continue"; however, women themselves were 
expressing reluctance to "be a guinea pig."51 Similarly for AIDS, some 
observers suggested that patients had become so infuriated with complex 
eligibility requirements surrounding research projects that they engaged 
in "rampant 'lying and cheating'" to be accepted into promising studies. 
In other cases, subjects might drop out of testing if they suspected they 
had gotten placebos, or else might share medication with others, adjust 
dosages as they saw fit, or secretly continue alternate types of treatment. 
According to one analysis, such individuals could "justify non .. compli .. 
ance with protocols" by adopting a "coercion defense"; if society and sci .. 
ence refused to recognize their need for medical support and free choice 
of treatments, patients bore no obligation to comply with the medical 
system's rules.52 
Challenging Scientific Authority 
Beyond questions of research funding and testing procedure, some AIDS 
and breast cancer activists literally confronted researchers whose perspec .. 
tive did not seem politically acceptable; at a 1994 American Association 
for the Advancement of Science panel, critics who accused NCI, FDA 
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and the American Cancer Society (ACS) of ignoring links between breast 
cancer and environmental pollution "exchanged insults with ... sceptical 
scientists."53 
Some activists' interpretations directly challenged medical system 
motives. As Nature observed in 1991, women's health advocates often 
put "faith in the belief that disease can be prevented by appropriate 
behaviour, implying that the behavioural and social sciences are as im .. 
portant as the traditional biomedical sciences in creating a new research 
agenda ... a view that would predicate a change in ... NIH ... mission."54 
Some breast cancer advocates accused the medical establishment of sys .. 
tematically denying any evidence of nutrition and environmental poilu .. 
cion as causal factors. A 1993 Ms. article blamed cancellation of an NCI 
study on whether low .. fat diets could lower cancer rates on clinicians 
"accumstomed to having a virtual monopoly on the breast cancer research 
pie." The author, head of the National Women's Health Network's Breast 
Cancer Committee, accused doctors of favoring high.-tech, high.-inter .. 
vention and high.-cost chemical and hormonal cancer treatment; chang .. 
ing diet would not give medical interests dollars or prestige, but [i]magine 
the profits if half the healthy population were put on yet another drug." 
Another piece accused NCI and ACS of neglecting evidence linking breast 
cancer to organochlorine contamination, quoting a University of Illinois 
environmental medicine professor who called "the cancer establishment ... 
myopically fixated on obsolete blame.-the.-victim theories." In conspira.-
torial.-sounding language, Ms. maintained that "a golden circle of power 
and money," including "mostly male" medical centers, doctors, drug com.-
panies, ACS and NCI, pursued mutually.-beneficial political and finan .. 
cial interests while rejecting evidence which threatened their control. 
This inside group could then be defined as the opponent-the Ms. cover 
asked, "Why Did They Dismiss Dietary Fat?"- "they" meaning NCI and 
other institutions "firmly locked into the myth perpetrated by the mod .. 
ern medical profession" pushing pharmaceutical interests ahead of lifestyle 
and environmental health concerns. 55 
Breast cancer and AIDS activists did not hesitate to use political clout 
to force reconsideration of science which did not suit their convictions. 
In the 1990s, Long Island women detected what seemed unusual clusters 
of breast cancer in certain counties and focused on water supply contami .. 
nation as cause. Examining the data, investigators for New York State 
found no scientific justification for further pursuit; but the Long Island 
Breast Cancer Coalition, unsatisfied by that decision, won backing from 
Senator Alfonse D'Amato to push for re.-opening the question. At a pub .. 
lic hearing convened by the Center for Disease Control (CDC), Long 
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Island activists expressed conviction that pesticides and toxic waste lay 
behind area breast cancers. The CDC subsequently found no scientific 
basis for concern about Long Island breast cancer and pollution, yet thanks 
to political mobilization, Congress allocated money to undertake a spe~ 
cial investigation anyway.56 
In other cases, advocates challenged what authorities said were ratio~ 
nat decisions to end ineffective research. When NIH judged in 1994 that 
alternate proposals and programs for other cities should supersede New 
York clinical AIDS trials, Gotham's politicians joined activists and pa~ 
tients in protest. While agency officials insisted the move would shift 
funding from "mediocre" to "the best science," city doctors maintained 
that NIH had failed to consider New York's sheer number of AIDS pa~ 
tients and need for fair minority representation in trials. TAG activists 
called for an independent review of why competing programs ranked ahead 
of New York's.57 
As further challenge to authority, activists and medical allies disputed 
official rulings on the value of ideologically.-appealing drugs. In the early 
1990s, after the Kenya Medical Research Institute claimed impressive 
improvement in AIDS patients' immune resistance and health status af~ 
ter oral alpha interferon treatment, some African.-American activists be .. 
came vocal proponents. Though NIH found no scientific support, seg~ 
ments of the African~ American community alleged that racism kept fed~ 
eral authorities and the medical system from acknowledging value in Af .. 
rican.-derived therapy. Members of the National Medical Association, a 
black doctors' professional group, expressed confidence in oral alpha 
interferon's efficacy. Surrounded by controversy, NIH re~opened the ques .. 
tion in 1992, moving to undertake clinical trials re.-assessing the Kenyan 
treatment.58 Of course, desperate patients in earlier instances had main .. 
tained faith in certain medical options even after expert assessment judged 
them worthless, as illustrated in the case of Laetrile. By the 1990s, how .. 
ever, the impressive political clout of breast cancer and AIDS could actu .. 
ally persuade government authorities to re.-open investigations after first 
rulings did not serve advocates' political pleasure. Activist pressure even 
helped win 1996 FDA approval for highly experimental transplant of ba .. 
boon bone.-marrow into an AIDS patient, even as experts warned such 
animal.-to.-man tissue grafts risked medical nightmare by facilitating spread 
of new viruses. One researcher figured officials only agreed since the test 
was expected almost definitely to fail, with the human system rejecting 
baboon material,59 but the incident highlighted how scientific consider .. 
ations had become negotiable within the highly charged political envi.-
ronment of AIDS. 
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Questioning of medical authority on breast cancer and AIDS came in 
a period which also showed broader American skepticism of conventional 
medicine. According to one 1990 report, over 33 percent of AIDS pa .. 
tients used unorthodox therapies such as acupuncture, imagery, 
megavitamin doses, and unapproved medicine. A more general1993 study 
correspondingly shocked the medical profession, showing one .. third of 
adults supplementing visits to regular physicians with chiropractic care, 
relaxation technique and other alternative treatments for physical pain 
(back and headaches) and other problems (anxiety, depression, and in .. 
somnia). Such therapy found a home within mainstream health institu .. 
tions; by end of1995, the relatively new NIH Office of Alternative Medi .. 
cine had given out almost $8 million in research support, while Harvard, 
UCLA, and thirty other medical schools offered classes on unconven .. 
tional treatments. Alternative medicine's gains came with help from po .. 
litical friends such as Senator Harkin (vitally positioned as chair of the 
Senate subcommittee with oversight for health, interested himself in bee .. 
sting therapy), succeeding despite harsh criticism from some doctors, re .. 
searchers, and agency insiders. In 1994, Harkin publicly battled Dr. Jo .. 
seph Jacobs, former head of the Alternative Medicine office, who charged 
the senator with "professionally insulting" attempts "to politically intimi .. 
date" officials. Brandishing his role as unconventional therapy's political 
champion, Harkin accused Jacobs of not being properly committed to 
honest studies of alternate medicine. But for many scientists, the new 
NIH office and medical courses confirmed fear that non,scientific work 
was gaining a foothold in respectable institutions, violating the ultimate 
divide between objectivity and quackery. 60 
For some feminists by the 1990s, the issue of what justified scientific 
authority had become a powerful philosophical issue. Critics such as Sandra 
Harding suggested that by definition, science could not be isolated from 
its historically male .. dominated political and social context, so resulting 
sexist and racist bias undermined the system's supposed objectivity. Though 
such feminists maintained their analysis was meant to help improve sci, 
entific accuracy, some scientists interpreted it as academic .. leftist "hostil .. 
ity," hopelessly misguided attacks out to destroy science.61 
Conclusion 
Breast cancer and AIDS activism had generated high political profile in 
relatively brief time, drawing support from growing organizational power 
and aggressive strategy. For AIDS and breast cancer patients, frustration 
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with vicious disease readily translated into protest against government 
and medical systems; as one woman declared, "Nothing will ever happen 
to breast cancer unless it is politicized." Activists even influenced public 
perceptions of risk; though AIDS and breast cancer both undeniably rep~ 
resented terrible problems, their political description as an "epidemic" or 
"holocaust" which "attacks ... brutally and indiscriminately" sometimes 
threatened to overshadow other serious disease. Convinced that research, 
establishment bias against women's health and AIDS had shortchanged 
previous funding, activists harnessed numbers and political power to win 
significant increases in federal research targeted to "their" diseases. 
Both AIDS and breast cancer groups maintained that medical and gov~ 
ernment narrow~mindedness required them to challenge not just the di~ 
rection of appropriations, but also established research policies and fun~ 
damental scientific values. While scientists considered peer review and 
controlled testing proven methods for confirming results, critics disdained 
such rules as bureaucratic nonsense biased to exclude alternate ideas. Even 
as some researchers complained about endangering the integrity of sci~ 
ence, activists took philosophical pride in challenging the system. Advo~ 
cacy meant defining enemies; unwilling to accept official decisions against 
politically~appealing treatments, activists turned medical rulings into 
power games for new battle. By the 1990s, federal officials and doctors 
had been compelled to address this activist pressure, making some basic 
change in research procedure, allowing interest groups more chances to 
comment on policy, and even re~opening decisions which had displeased 
activists. 
While breast cancer and AIDS groups were not the first American 
organizations to fight for specific medical causes and research money, the 
1980s-1990s activism was unique in two respects. First, as those organi~ 
zations gained political power, they reached for unprecedented influence 
on government agencies, demanding a voice in distributing research funds, 
changing policy, and setting research agendas. While in earlier decades 
the March of Dimes had raised significant sums to fight polio, the group 
followed mainstream medical opinion on the best direction for using such 
research funds; by contrast, a 1996 breast cancer petition asked the Presi~ 
dent and Congress to "mandate that ... breast cancer activists help deter, 
mine how the money gets spent."62 Second, breast cancer and AIDS ac, 
tivists went beyond other medical causes in posing broad and direct chal~ 
lenges to scientific authority; again, polio groups had not disputed the 
objective value of research or fought to reverse specific rulings. Breast 
cancer and AIDS groups did not deny the ultimate value of medicine 
itself; in fact, they expressed repeated confidence that with significant 
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increases in funding and national commitment, researchers would find 
better treatments; cures, and preventive measures for such terrible dis~ 
eases. Yet to achieve such gains, activists contended, the medical com~ 
munity needed to reform its entire approach, even re~considering the value 
of randomized testing and supposedly "objective" results to accommodate 
sensibilities of patients and politics. 
By the mid .. 1990s, breast cancer and AIDS activists had won signifi~ 
cant power, reviewing and planning research along with scientists and 
officials. How had advocates achieved such change in so short a time? 
One doctor argued that "liberal" researchers and agencies had been "sym .. 
pathetic to the plight" of seriously~ill patients and also "easily intimi~ 
dated."63 While that explanation contained elements of truth, it did not 
fully reflect the power of AIDS and breast cancer activilsts in taking re .. 
search to newly politicized heights. In part, these activists may have gained 
new influence in setting policy precisely because they were able to rally 
political clout behind such fundamental challenges to scientific method 
and federal authority. Smaller demands would not have attracted enough 
public attention to gain political credibility for winning major policy~ 
making concessions, but activists' philosophical and political attacks on 
the medical system and government agencies resonated with many Ameri .. 
cans' broader doubts about authority in the 1980s and 1990s. The activ~ 
ists' critiques alienated some scientists, who resisted what seemed unjus~ 
tified interference by non .. experts who failed to appreciate the value of 
objective method. But increasing numbers of researchers t:)Und some truth 
in activists' arguments about previous bias in the medical system, leading 
some doctors, agency officials and politicians alike to decide they could 
accommodate at least some demands of AIDS and breast cancer groups. 
By pressing their philosophical and political challenges to scientific and 
federal authority, AIDS and breast cancer groups won new policy~making 
authority themselves. 
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